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Recent theoretical research on rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) suggests that
identical individuals prefer a random to a bidding Rosca when participants save for a lumpy
durable or an investment good. Here,in contrast, under the assumption that participants are
risk averse and that their incomes are stochastic and independent, it is shown that a random
Rosca is not advantageous, while participation in a bidding Rosca improves ex ante expected
utility if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. When information
on individual incomes is private, fixed contributions to a bidding Rosca help to mitigate the
problem  of  information  asymmetries.  When  information  on  incomes  is  public,  a  lack  of
enforceability of variable contributions may explain the existence of Roscas instead of more
efficient insurance arrangements.
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1  Introduction
The rotating savings and credit association (Rosca), an informal financial institution observed
around  the  world,  has  attracted  considerable  theoretical  and  empirical  research  recently.
Roscas are popular among high as well as low income households
1 and flourish in economic
settings where formal financial institutions seem to fail to meet the needs of a large fraction of
the  population.  In  general  terms,  a  Rosca  can  be  defined  as  ‘a  voluntary  grouping  of
individuals  who  agree  to  contribute  financially  at  each  of  a  set  of  uniformly-spaced  dates
towards  the  creation  of  a  fund,  which  will  then  be  allotted  in  accordance  with  some
prearranged principle to each member of the group in turn’ (Calomiris and Rajarman, 1998).
Once a member has received a fund, also called pot, she is excluded from the allotment of
future pots until the Rosca ends. In a so-called random Rosca, a lot determines each period’s
‘winner’ of the pot. In a bidding Rosca, an auction is staged among the members who have not
yet received a pot. The highest bid wins the pot and the amount the winner pays is distributed
among  the  members  or  added  to  future  pots.  In  a  third,  empirically  relevant,  allocation
mechanism, the decision on each period’s allocation of the pot is left to the Rosca organizer.
2
The name suggests that Roscas serve as a financial intermediary by transforming the
bundled savings of a group into what might be considered a loan to one Rosca participant in
each period. The theoretical literature on Roscas has entirely focussed on participants with
non-stochastic incomes. Kuo (1993) analyses bidding Roscas when individuals differ in that
they  discount  future  consumption  with  distinct  discount  factors.  These  are  drawn  from  a
common distribution and are private knowledge. Moreover, in every period each participant is
                                                
1  While  Levenson  and  Besley  (1996)  find  that  participation  is  highest  among  high
income households in Taiwan, Handa and Kirton (1999) report that, in Jamaica, low income
households are most likely to join a Rosca.
2 In Handa and Kirton’s (1999) sample, 53 percent of the Roscas operated in this way.2
assigned a new discount factor. Assuming that all participants share the same beliefs about the
distribution of other participants’ discount factors, the author derives Bayes-Nash equilibrium
bidding  strategies.  In  Kovsted  and  Lyk-Jensen  (1999),  each  participant  can  engage  in  an
investment project and has limited access to outside credit. The revenues of the projects differ
among  participants.  The  revenue  yielded  by  each  participant’s  project  is  his  private
information, but all participants have the same beliefs about the distribution of revenues of the
other participants’ projects. Deriving Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies in a bidding
Rosca, the authors find that when either outside credit is not too costly, or the distribution of
revenues is sufficiently widely dispersed, a bidding Rosca is preferred to a random Rosca.
Besley et al. (1993, 1995) assume that participants do not have access to outside credit and
join a Rosca to finance a durable good whose costs require saving for more than one-period. If
participants have identical preferences and incomes, a random Rosca is preferred to the bidding
arrangement. If, however, participants are sufficiently heterogeneous, a bidding Rosca can be
preferred to a random Rosca.  In  both  of  the  former  two  papers,  the  bidding  arrangement
provides a mechanism to allocate pots earlier to participants who have a higher willingness to
pay and can therefore be advantageous if participants are not identical.
In many economic settings where Roscas are found, individuals are exposed to both
idiosyncratic  and  aggregate  risks.  Examples  are  farmers’  uncertainty  about  harvests,
employment  uncertainty  among  casual  labourers  and  individual  illness  when  no  health
insurance  is  available.  There  is  a  body  of  empirical  evidence  that,  when  participants  are
exposed  to  risk,  Roscas  can  serve  as  an  insurance  mechanism  (Calomiris  and  Rajaraman,
1998). In the approaches taken by Besley et al. (1993) and Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999),
the outcome of the bidding Rosca remains unaltered no matter if the auctions for all future pots
are staged at the beginning of the Rosca or if the auction for each period’s pot takes place in3
that same period. Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998), however, find that, except for one case
3, all
of the empirical literature reports Rosca arrangements where bidding is concurrent with the
allocation of pots. For an actual Rosca in an Indian city, they calculate the implicit interest rate
for the funds each participant received from the Rosca. For each period, this rate depends on
the remaining duration of the Rosca as well as the value of the winning bid. In contrast to the
predictions of the models of Besley et al. (1993) and Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999), they find
that winning bids do not decrease steadily from period to period and that the implicit rate of
interest fluctuates significantly without any obvious  trend.  Calomiris  and  Rajaraman (1998)
conclude that, at least for their sample Rosca, deterministic models do not capture the essential
features. Instead, they stress the role of Roscas as an insurance mechanism by allocating each
period’s  pot  to  the  bidder  who  has  suffered  the  most  severe  shock.  Moreover,  if  several
members suffer a severe shock in the same period, bidding compensates those who do not win
said period’s pot. Besley et al. (1993) argue that Roscas are not suited for insuring against risk
because the fund can be obtained only once while shocks might occur several times during the
duration of the Rosca. Empirical evidence, however, shows that many individuals are members
of several Roscas or hold more than one share in the same Rosca, thus being entitled to bid for
more than one pot.
4 Of course, Roscas cannot effectively insure against aggregate shocks when
participants belong to an economically and socially homogenous group like small farmers in a
village whose harvests depend on the weather to a large extent. But even there, as Townsend’s
(1994) results suggest, a variety of mechanisms appear to be at work in providing substantial
insurance against idiosyncratic risks like illness or death of farm animals.
                                                
3 This is Campbell and Ahn (1962) for Korea.
4 Handa and Kirton (1999) report that, in their sample of 1000 Jamaican households,
respondents joined on average 1.4 Roscas during the year prior to the interview and held 1.3
shares in any Rosca they joined.4
The aim of this study is twofold: I analyze how bidding Roscas function under the
following assumptions. Participants are risk-averse and use funds from the Rosca entirely for
consumption, each participant’s income being stochastic. For most of the analysis, I assume,
moreover, that participants cannot observe other participants’ incomes, but all share the same
beliefs about the distribution from which the incomes are drawn. In addition, the case of public
information  on  incomes  is  also  briefly  considered.  There  are  neither  credit  nor  savings
opportunities outside the Rosca. Second, with the results thus derived, it is shown how Roscas
can partly solve the problem of insurance against idiosyncratic risks when no formal insurance
is available.
2 Optimal Ex-ante Insurance among Individuals
As point of departure for the analysis of insurance in the absence of market institutions, this
section  outlines  the  problem  of  optimal  insurance  when  individual  income  is  private
knowledge. To keep the analysis simple, assume that two identical individuals in period zero
are confronted with stochastic incomes Yi, i = 1, 2 in period one which are drawn from a
distribution F on some domain I. There are neither savings nor borrowing opportunities. Each
agent evaluates period one consumption with a Bernoulli utility function v(yi) where v´ > 0 and
v´´ < 0 for all yi.
5 First assume that the realizations y1 and y2 are observed by both agents and
that  they  can  make  binding  commitments,  i.e.,  in  period  zero,  they  agree  on  a  menu  that
assigns a (possibly negative) transfer from agent j to agent i, t(yi, yj) say, to each possible pair
of period one incomes. Restricting attention to symmetric rules for t, i.e. t(yj, yi) = - t(yi, yj), the
task is to maximize ex ante expected utility given by
   E[v(Yj - t(Yj, Yi))] = E[v(Yi + t(Yi, Yj))] =  v y t y y dF y dF y i i j i j I I ( ( , )) ( ) ( ) + , i, j =1, 2, i ¹ j.
                                                
5 Throughout the paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters, while lower
case letters represent particular values random variables assume.5
It  is  easily  shown  that  under  these  assumptions  t*(yi, yj) = (yj - yi)/2  and  thus
E[v(Yi + t*(Yi, Yj))] = E[v((Yi + Yj)/2)] constitutes the optimal arrangement.
The question is whether this ex ante optimum can also be achieved when each agent
only observes his own income but both agents know F.  In  the  terminology  of  mechanism
design theory, we now seek  a  mechanism  that  implements  t*  in  Bayes-Nash  strategies.  In
period zero the agents agree on some rule g(bi, bj) that determines the transfer t in period one
where bi is an announcement i makes after observing yi. Obviously, b is a strategic variable and
depends on g. In a symmetric equilibrium, both agents play b*(y), which must satisfy
(2.1)  b*(y) = argmax
b
E[v(y + g(b, b*(Y))]  for all y.
If g* is to implement t*, we must have
(2.2) g*(b*(yi), b*(yj)) = (yj – yi)/2.
Thus
(2.3) g*(b, b*(y)) = h*(b) + y/2  for some function h*.
Substituting g* for g in (1) and using (3), the b* corresponding to g* must satisfy
(2.4)  b*(y) = argmax
b
E[v(y + h*(b) +Y/2)]  for all y.
It is immediately seen that the maximizing b of the RHS of (2.4) is independent of y, which
contradicts (2.2). Thus, even if agents can make binding commitments, the ex ante first-best
outcome cannot be achieved when individual income is private information. As long as there
are no outside savings or borrowing opportunities, the above example can be generalized easily
to the situation where agents make an arrangement for more than one future period.
Now consider a two-period bidding Rosca. In period zero the two agents make an
arrangement to pay a stipulated amount m into a pot, both in period one and two. In the first
period, the agents bid for pot one. Assuming that the price b° the winner of this auction has to
pay gets equally  distributed  among  the  two  participants  and  that  agents  bid  with  identical
bidding functions b(y), we would expect the agent with the higher need for funds to submit the6
winning bid. In our model, ‘higher need’ is equivalent to ‘lower income’. If b° < 2m, then the
agent with the lower income in period one, say agent one, receives a net transfer from the
other agent. If the bidding functions are such that it is always true that the agent with lower
income in period one receives a net transfer from the other agent, then we have an ex ante
improvement from joining the Rosca when the utility contribution of period two consumption
is neglected. In period two, however, agent one has to pay a net transfer of m to the other
agent. Whether this payment constitutes a transfer from the better to the worse off depends on
the particular values of period two incomes. Adding this effect to the improvement of ex ante
utility the period one transfer has, the question is whether the expectation over the sum of
these two effects still lets the participation in a Rosca appear advantageous. Towards this end,
the functioning of bidding Roscas needs to be analyzed first.
3  Bidding Procedures and Equilibrium Bid Functions
To set out the analytical framework, assume that participant i evaluates period one and two
consumption  levels  ci1  and  ci2  with  a  bivariate  von-Neuman-Morgenstern  utility  function,
u(ci1, ci2)
6 which is strictly increasing and concave in each argument, and that, in period t, her
income is drawn from a distribution characterized by the smooth distribution function Ft on
domain  It = [ylt, yut].  All  yit,  i, t = 1,  2  are  assumed  to  be  independently  and  identically
distributed according to Ft. We thus allow for seasonal variations in the income generating
process. The participants have access to neither credit nor savings opportunities outside the
Rosca. Although this is a very restrictive assumption, it is not wholly implausible considering
that, in many parts of the world, Roscas are observed primarily among women.
7 If they are not
the heads of their respective household, they might not have control over money that is not
invested in some fixed scheme because heads of households may have different, likely shorter
                                                
6 For ease of exposition, I restrict attention to two-period Roscas.
7 See, for example, Adams and Canavesi de Saherno (1989) for Roscas in Bolivia.7
sighted, ideas about how to use the money.
8 In this section it is further assumed that every
agent participates in only one Rosca and  that  the  contribution  to  the  Rosca  each  member
makes every period, m has been agreed upon beforehand and can be considered fixed.
If  any  partial  derivative  of  u  satisfies  a  lower  Inada  condition,  define
c x u c c j i i c c x i
j i
= = ¥ ¹




( , ) 1 2 .  To  avoid  technical
complications, we require ylt - m > ct.
In the literature, a variety of arrangements have been observed when it comes to the
auctioning of the pot. The main differences are the type of auction staged and the rule that
distributes the winning bid among the other participants. As to the latter, the most important
issue is whether the winning bid is distributed  among  the  active  participants  only  or  if  all
participants receive a fraction. In both cases, the distribution occurs equally. Since this paper
concentrates on two-period Roscas where only one auction takes place, this difference does
not matter for the present analysis. Further, throughout this study, I neglect any problems of
enforceability of contributions to the Rosca by members who have received a pot before and
thus are only left with obligations. It is assumed that defaulting on contributions results in
exclusion from future Roscas and that the disutility therefrom is prohibitively high.
9 Another
important empirical feature, the remuneration of the Rosca organizer is also excluded from this
analysis.
The two predominant types of auctions encountered are the so-called first-price sealed
                                                
8 Anderson and Baland (1999) find strong support for this claim in their sample of low
income households in Nairobi. Thomas (1993) reports that income in the hands of women
tends to increase the share of the household budget spent on health, education and housing as
well as improvements in child health.
9  There  is  sufficient  empirical  evidence  in  support  of  this  assumption.  See,  among
others, Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998).8
bid auction and the oral English auction. In the former, each active member
10 submits a closed
envelope with her bid. In a meeting, the envelopes are opened and the highest bid receives the
pot at the price of her bid submitted. Equivalently, each active member communicates her bid
to the organizer of the Rosca privately who then allocates the pot to the participant with the
highest bid.
In  an  oral  English  auction,  the  active  participants  of  the  Rosca  meet  and  submit
successive oral bids until only one bidder, the winner, remains. We might ideally think of an
oral English auction as a so called button auction where each bidder presses a button in front
of him as the standing bid continuously increases. A bidder drops out of the bidding process
once she releases the button. The auction is over once there is only one bidder pressing her
button (see Matthews, 1990). She receives the pot at a price equal to the standing bid at the
moment the last bidder dropped out. For the derivation of bidding equilibria in the oral English
auction, it is useful to consider a second price sealed bid auction. In this auction, as in the first
price sealed bid auction,  the  active  participants  submit  their  bids  in  sealed  envelopes.  The
highest bid wins but this time the winner does not pay his own bid, but the second highest bid.
Although this type of auction is not reported in any of the Rosca literature, its equilibrium
bidding strategy is the same as in the oral English auction. In the button auction, each bidder’s
problem is to decide when to release the button. Suppose, however, that each agent releases
her  button  at  a  standing  bid  equal  to  her  bid  in  the  second  price  sealed  bid  auction.  If
participants follow this rule, the payoffs to all participants are equal in the second price sealed
bid and the English auction. In the language of game theory, the reduced normal form games
corresponding to the second price sealed bid and the oral English auction are identical. Thus
they are strategically equivalent, which implies that the equilibrium in the second price sealed
                                                
10  Throughout  this  paper,  those  participants  who  have  not  yet  received  a  pot  are
referred to as ‘active’.9
bid auction is also the equilibrium of the oral English auction.
11
Roscas with an oral English auction are prevalent in rural settings where the meetings
each period also have a socializing function. The members typically belong to the same social
group, e.g. caste (see, e.g., Bouman, 1979). In such cases, it is likely that the participants are
fairly well informed about each other’s incomes. In urban settings, in contrast, while mostly
still belonging to the same social group, participants frequently do not know each other outside
the Rosca. Often, the Rosca is administered by a professional organizer (see, e.g., Kumar,
1991). Consequently, the members know little about the other participants’ incomes. Therefore
the following analysis is limited to the following cases. First we consider Roscas with oral
English auctions under public information on incomes. Secondly we analyze Roscas with first
price sealed bid and oral English auctions under private information on incomes.
A Public Information on Incomes, Oral English Auction
In an oral English auction, if agent two drops out of the bidding process first, agent one’s
consumption in period one is given by y1 - m + (2m – b2 + b2/2) where y1 – m is his period one
income minus his contribution to the Rosca and (2m – b2 + b2/2) is the pot he receives minus
the standing bid at which agent two drops out, plus half of this bid that is redistributed to him.
If he is a period one winner, his period two consumption is y – m where y is agent one’s period
two  income.  Accordingly,  his  expected  utility  is  ~( / , ) u y m b Y m 1 2 2 + - - ,  where





(, ) ( ) × 2
2
2
. If, on the other hand, agent one  drops  out  of  the
bidding process first, his expected utility is given by  ~( / , ) u y m b Y m 1 1 2 - + + , where b1 is the
standing bid at which he drops out.
                                                
11 This result is in line with the standard literature on auctions, see, e.g., Matthews,
1990.10
What is a participant’s maximum willingness to pay for the period-one pot, b
0 say?
Obviously, at a price of b
0, he attains the same level of utility no matter whether he receives the
pot or not. Formally,
(3.1) b
0(y) º {b: ~( / , ) ~( / , ) u y m b Y m u y m b Y m - + + = + - - 2 2 }.
I shall argue that b
0 corresponds to a bidder’s value in a standard (not a Rosca) auction with
symmetric independent private value (SIPV) bidders.
12 In such auctions, by definition, a bidder
is indifferent between winning and not winning the item auctioned when she has to pay a price
equal to her true value. This definition applies to b
0(×) in the present case. By (3.1), a bidder
with first period income y is indifferent between receiving pot one or not at a price of b
0(y).
In the empirical literature on the role of Roscas as event insurance, it is observed that
the bidder with the most urgent current need submits the highest bid to auction the pot (see
Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998). For the present model, this gives rise to
Assumption 1: b
0 is strictly decreasing in period-one income, formally
db y
dy
0( )  = 2
  ~( ( )/ , ) ~( ( )/ , )
~( ( )/ , ) ~( ( )/ , )
u y m b y Y m u y m b y Y m











+ - - - - + +
+ - - + - + +
 < 0 for all y.
Assumption 1 states that we exclude decision makers whose maximum willingness to pay for
pot one is not strictly decreasing in period-one income. With this at hand, we can characterize
the bidding equilibrium for the present case.
                                                
12 In a standard SIPV bidder auction, there is one seller who owns a single, indivisible
item and n buyers. Each bidder knows n and his own valuation (or value, in short) for the item,
which is the maximum amount he would be willing to pay for the item, but none of the other
bidders’ values. The values are identically, independently distributed (see Matthews, 1990). It
is further assumed that the seller cannot set a minimum price.11
Proposition 1: If Assumption 1 holds and incomes are publicly observed, the unique
Nash equilibrium of an oral English auction implies that the bidder with the lower
period one income, j say, wins the pot and pays b
0(yj) - e with some small e.
Proof: For j, it is a dominant strategy not to release his button before b
0(yj) while for the other
bidder, i say, b
0(yj) - e is a best reply to j’s playing b
0(yj) because, as long as j wins pot one, i’s
utility is increasing in the winning bid. QED
Such ‘crafty’ bidding practices are reported in Bouman (1979) where those in most urgent
need of funds are bid up higher than the actual needs of other participants would require.
B Private Information on Incomes, First Price Sealed Bid Auction
In a first price sealed bid auction, bids are submitted after both agents have observed their
respective period one incomes. If agent one bids higher than agent two, his consumption in
period one is given by y1 - m + (2m – b1 + b1/2) where y1 – m is his period one income minus
his contribution to the Rosca and (2m – b1 + b1/2) is the pot he receives minus his bid he has to
pay as the winner, plus half of this bid that is redistributed to him. If he is a period one winner,
his  period  two  consumption  is  y – m.  Accordingly,  his  expected  utility  is
~( / , ) u y m b Y m 1 1 2 + - - . The  probability  of  this  event  is  P(b1 > B2).  If,  on  the  other  hand,
agent  one  submits  a  lower  bid  than  agent  two,  his  expected  utility  is
E u y m B Y m B b [~( / , )| ] 1 2 2 1 2 - + + > , the probability of this event being P(b1 < B2). Note that it
is assumed that bids range over an interval of the real line, so that the probability of identical
bids is zero. To derive the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy, substitute b(Y2) for B2
where  b´(×) < 0.  Thus,  agent  one  assumes  that  the  other  participant  follows  some  strategy
according to which she submits higher bids the lower her period one income is. Since b(×) is
assumed  to  be  smooth  and  strictly  decreasing,  the  inverse  function  b
-1(×)  is  defined  and12
continuously  differentiable.  Consequently,  agent  one’s  interim  expected  utility  before
submitting his bid is given by
(3.2) E[U
1| y1] = ~( / , ) u y m b Y m 1 1 2 + - - (1-F(b
-1(b1))) 
 +E u y m b Y Y m b Y b [~( ( )/ , )| ( ) ] 1 2 2 1 2 - + + > F(b
-1(b1)),
13
where the task is to maximize (3.2) over b1. Equating the derivative of (3.2) with respect to b1
to zero and substituting b(y1) for b1, we obtain the Bayes-Nash equilibrium:
-F(y1)  d
dx x y E u y m b Y Y m Y x [~( ( )/ , )| ]| 1 2 2 2
1 - + + < = = -~( ( )/ , ) u y m b y Y m 1 1 1 2 + - - b´(y1)(1-F(y1))
(3.3) + {E u y m b Y Y m Y y [~( ( )/ , )| ] 1 2 2 1 2 - + + <  - ~( ( )/ , ) u y m b y Y m 1 1 2 + - - } f(y1).
Equation  (3.3)  states  that  the  marginal  loss  of  expected  utility  from  pretending  to  have  a
slightly different y1 than that actually realized, equals the marginal gain in expected utility from
doing so. Thus b(×) is such that for any x ¹ y1 submitting b(x) is not optimal when one’s true
income is y1. The term on the LHS represents the loss of expected utility when pretending
y1 + dy1  instead  of  y1  arising  from  an  expected  lower  winning  bid  of  agent  two  which,
conditional on agent two winning the pot, implies a higher net transfer from agent one to agent
two. The first term on the RHS of (3.3) is the utility gain resulting from paying a lower price
for pot one in the case agent one wins, while the term in braces is the change in expected utility
arising from the change in the probability of winning the pot in period one.
Rearranging (3.2) gives the differential equation for b(×).
Proposition 2:
If Assumption 1 and conditions (i) and (ii) from Appendix 1 hold and incomes are
privately observed, then
                                                
13 For notational convenience, we write F(×) instead F1(×) and yk instead of yk1, k = l, u,
throughout the paper.13
(i)  the  symmetric  Bayes-Nash  equilibrium  of  a  first  price  sealed  bid  auction  is
characterized by
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(ii) bidders underbid, i.e. b(y)< b
0(y) for all y < yu,
(iii) bids are strictly decreasing in income, i.e. b´(y) < 0 for all y.
Proof:
(i) Necessity follows from (3.3), sufficiency from (i) and (ii) of Appendix 1.
14
(ii) and (iii) Applying L’Hôpital’s rule,
15 we find that
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 = b
0´(yu).
Thus  b(yu-dy) < b
0(yu-dy)  for  some  dy > 0.  Further,  if  b(y) < b
0(y)  it  follows  from  (i)  of
Proposition 2 together with Assumption 1 that b´(y) < 0. To show that b(yu-dy) < b
0(yu-dy) for
some dy > 0 implies b(y) < b
0(y) for all y, assume that for some y0 < yu b(y0) = b
0(y0). This
implies b´(y0) = 0 > b
0´(y0) and thus b(y0-dy) < b
0(y0-dy) for some positive dy. Thus b(y) and
b
0(y) do not intersect for y < yu.
To prove that there are no symmetric equilibria with increasing bidding strategies, b
+(y)
say, notice that (i) and (ii) of Appendix 1 are sufficient to show that any strategy b
+ satisfying a
                                                
14 Note that Appendix 1 only gives sufficient conditions for b being a local maximizer
of  (3.2).  For  sufficient  conditions  for  b  being  a  global  maximizer,  see  the  remarks  in
Appendix 1.
15  Note  that  the  point  (yu,  b
0(yu))  constitutes  a  singularity  for  the  differential
equation (3.4).14
first order condition analogous to (3.3) constitutes a local minimum of the bidder’s resulting
interim expected utility analogous to (3.2). QED
C. Private Information on Incomes, Oral English Auction
If agent one bids lower than agent two, his expected utility is  ~( / , ) u y m b Y m 1 1 2 - + + . The
probability of this event is P(b1 < B2). If, on the other hand, agent one submits a higher bid than
agent two, his expected utility is  E u y m B Y m B b [~( / , )| ] 1 2 2 1 2 + - - < , the probability of this
event being P(b1 > B2). To derive the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy, substitute b(Y2)
for B2 where b´(×) < 0. Consequently, agent one’s interim expected utility before submitting his
bid is given by
(3.5) E[U
2| y1] = ~( / , ) u y m b Y m 1 1 2 - + + F(b
-1(b1))
 +E u y m b Y Y m b Y b [~( ( )/ , )| ( ) ] 1 2 2 1 2 + - - < (1-F(b
-1(b1))),
Equating the derivative of this with respect to b1 to zero and substituting b(y1) for b1, we
obtain the Bayes-Nash equilibrium:
-(1-F(y1)) d
dx s x y E u y m b Y Y m Y x [~( ( )/ , )| ]| 1 2 2 2
1 + - - > = = -~( ( )/ , ) u y m b y Y m s 1 1 1 2 - + + bs´(y1)
F(y1))
(3.6)           + {E u y m b Y Y m Y y s [~( ( )/ , )| ] 1 2 2 1 2 + - - >  - ~( ( )/ , ) u y m b y Y m s 1 1 2 - + + } f(y1).
The subscript s indicates that (3.6) characterizes the equilibrium of a second price sealed bid
auction. Equation (3.6) states that the marginal loss of expected utility from pretending to have
realized a slightly different y1 than is actually the case equals the marginal gain in expected
utility from doing so. The interpretation of the terms in (3.6) is analogous to (3.3). Rearranging
(3.6) yields the differential equation for bs(×).
Proposition 3:
If Assumption 1 and conditions (iii) and (iv) from Appendix 1 hold and incomes are
privately observed, then15
(i) the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium of an oral English auction is characterized
by
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(ii) bidders overbid, i.e. b(y)> b
0(y) for all y > yl,
(iii) bids are strictly decreasing in income, i.e. bs´(y) < 0 for all y.
(i) Necessity follows from (3.6), sufficiency from (iii) and (vi) of Appendix 1.
(ii) and (iii) The proof of bs´(y) < 0 for all y is analogous to that of b´(y) < 0. One first shows
that 0 > bs´(yl) > b
0´(yl). Secondly, bs(y) > b
0(y) together with Assumption 1 implies bs´(y) < 0.
Finally bs(y0) = b
0(y0) for some y0 would imply bs´(y0) > b
0´(y0) and thus bs(×) and b
0(×) do not
intersect for any y > yl.
To show that there are no symmetric equilibria with increasing bidding strategies, an
argument analogous to that in the proof of Proposition 1 can be applied. QED
D Discussion
Figure 1 illustrates that in a first price sealed bid auction, bidders underbid relative to their true
valuation while they overbid in an English auction. Concerning the first price auction, this
result is in line with the equilibrium bidding behaviour in a standard SIPV bidder  auction.
Suppose a bidder submits b
0(y) when y is her period one income. In this case, winning the pot
does not make her any better off. If she submits a slightly lower bid, however, her probability
of  winning  decreases  slightly,  but  if  she  wins  she  improves  her  situation.  (3.3)  and  (3.4)
together with (3.6) show that, in equilibrium, the gains from underbidding more than outweigh
the  corresponding  losses.  For  a  bidder  with  income  yu,  however,  there  is  no  sense  in
underbidding because he loses the pot with probability one. Thus he will submit a bid equal to
b
0(yu), which is exactly what the boundary condition (3.4) states.16
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Turning to the second price auction, the present result of overbidding is in marked
contrast to the equilibrium behaviour in a standard SIPV bidder auction, where bidding one’s
true value is a dominant strategy. Suppose agent i bids b
0(yi). If agent j submits a higher bid, i
is not any better off than if she had won the pot at a price of b
0(yi). Bidding slightly more than
b
0(yi), however, improves her situation if j wins. On the other hand, by bidding b
0(yi) + dy, she
takes  the  chance  of  winning  the  pot  at  a  price  higher  than  her  valuation  with  positive
probability. (3.9) and (3.10) together with (3.6), however, show that, in equilibrium, the gains
from overbidding exceed the losses except for a bidder with income yl, who wins the pot with
probability one. Thus bs(yl) = b
0(yl). The key lesson from this is that, contrary to the standard
SIPV bidder second price auction, bidding in a Rosca is always strategic and  equilibria  in
dominant strategies fail to exist. The reason for this arises from the fact that, in the terminology
of Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999), in a Rosca auction, the seller is internalised in the group of
bidders. As a consequence, the loser of a Rosca auction is not left with the same economic
situation as before the beginning of the auction, but rather receives a gain from the share of the
winning bid that is distributed to him.17
Another interesting feature is the relationship between the rate of time preference and
bidding. If participants have utility functions of the form u(x1, x2) = v1(x1) + b v2(x2) where b is
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( ) 0  for  all  y.  Thus  high  discounting  of  future  consumption  goes
together with unambiguously higher bids for pot one. This comes as no surprise, as individuals
who care less about future consumption are less concerned about a possible obligation to pay a
net transfer of m one period later than receiving the pot in period one.
4  The Design of Equivalent Rosca Auctions
In  this  section  it  is  shown  that  participants’  payoffs  are  independent  not  only  of  how  the
winning bid is distributed among participants, but also, more surprisingly, of the amount of the
contribution participants make to the Rosca in period one.
Assume that participants have agreed on redistributing a fraction of (1-d) of the amount
the winner of pot one has to pay back to the winner, where 0 < d £ 1. Then the winner’s
consumption in period one is (y1 – m) + (2m – b + (1-d) b) where b is the amount he has to
pay. For the loser, period one consumption is given by (y1 - m) + d b. Thus, in equilibrium,
expected utility at the interim stage is given by
(4.1) E[U| y1, d] = E[~( ( , , ), ) u y m b Y y Y m 1 2 1 - + + d d |Y2 < y1] F(y1)
 +E u y m b y Y Y m Y y [~( ( , , ), )| ] 1 1 2 2 1 + - - > d d (1-F(y1)),
where E[U| y1] in (4.1) comprises both the English and the first price auction considered in the
previous  section.  b(×,×,d)  indicates  that  bidding  now  appears  to  depend  on  the  value  of  d.
Substituting b(×,×,1/2)/(2d) for b(×,×,d), however, transforms (4.1) to interim expected utility
under the rule that distributes the price paid for pot one equally among participants. Thus for18
any d and any of the auction regimes considered previously, participants will receive the same
payoffs in equilibrium. This means that, theoretically, the participants would not have to decide
on the value of d until the very start of the auction, no matter what incomes they observe.
What payoffs occur if, in period zero, participants agree not to pay in any contributions
in period one, but only in period two, and stage an auction for pot two in period one? If the
said auction is held as an English auction, participants will receive the same payoffs as in a
usual Rosca where they stage a first price auction for pot one. The payoffs of a usual Rosca
with an English auction, on the other hand, equal those from a Rosca with no contributions in
period one when a first price auction for pot two is staged in period one. To see this, note that,
in equilibrium, interim expected utility in the latter case is given by
(4.2) E[UD
1 | y1] = ~( ( ), ) u y y Y m 1 1 - + D F(y1) +E u y Y Y m Y y [~( ( ), )| ] 1 2 2 1 + - > D (1-F(y1)),
where D(×) represents the bidding strategy played in the first price auction in period one. Recall
that equilibrium interim expected utility in a usual Rosca with a second price auction in the first
period is
(4.3) E[Ubs
2 | y1] = ~( ( )/ , ) u y m b y Y m s 1 1 2 - + + F(y1)
 +E u y m b Y Y m Y y s [~( ( )/ , )| ] 1 2 2 1 2 + - - > (1-F(y1)).
Now, for any 
￿
bs(×), define the one to one mapping
(4.4)
￿
D (×) = m - 
￿
bs(×)/2.




bs2(×)) the agents can play in the usual Rosca second




D2 (×)) in a first price auction for pot two in period one yields
identical payoffs for all y1. Consequently, the equilibrium in the latter arrangement will involve
D(×) = m - bs(×)/2.  The  proof  of  the  payoff  equivalence  of  a  usual  Rosca  with  a  first  price
auction and a Rosca without period one contributions and a second price auction for pot two
in period one is analogous. There, the equilibrium involves Ds(×) = m - b(×)/2.19
These results show that, in a usual Rosca, the net transfer the loser of pot one (‘she’)
pays to the winner can literally be interpreted as her bid for a net transfer of m one-period
ahead. It further highlights the crucial importance of the fixed amount period two transfer as an
incentive for participants to pay an ex ante utility increasing transfer in period one.
5  Preferences for Risk Bearing and Preferences for Roscas
With the results of the previous two sections in hand, we can now ask the question: how do
preferences for risk-bearing  influence  the  decision  to  participate  in  a  bidding  or  a  random
Rosca? To answer this question, we shall make use of the concept of temporal risk aversion,
which  was  first  defined  by  Richard  (1975)  as  follows:  a  decision  maker  is  said  to  be
multivariate risk averse if, for any pair (x, y),  u12(x, y) < 0  and  multivariate  risk  seeking  if
u12(x, y) > 0. The case of u12(x, y) = 0 is defined as multivariate risk neutrality. If u’s arguments
refer to consumption at two points in time, ‘multivariate’ may be replaced by ‘temporal’ (see
Ingersoll, 1987). This concept can be illustrated as follows: Consider two lotteries L1 and L2
that are both resolved in period zero. L1 involves a consumption level of x in both periods with
probability 0.5 and a consumption level of y in both periods with probability 0.5. L2 involves a
consumption level of x in period one and y in period two with probability 0.5, and y in period
one and x in period two with probability 0.5. A temporal risk averse decision maker prefers L1
to L2, while a temporal risk seeking decision maker prefers L2 to L1 for any pair (x, y). Thus,
loosely speaking, a temporal risk seeking agent has a preference for lotteries whose payoffs are




                                                
16 Ronn (1988) argues that for a temporal risk averse agent, consumption levels in any
two periods are ‘substitutes through time’ while they are complements for a temporal risk
seeker.20
A random Rosca does exactly the latter. While uncorrelated without the Rosca, consumption
levels of random Rosca participants are negatively correlated. To make this argument rigorous,
we write a random Rosca participant’s ex ante expected utility as
(5.1) E[U
R] =  E u Y m Y m u Y m Y m Y Y 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 , [ ( , ) ( , )]/ + - + - + ,
where  EY Y 1 2 , [×] indicates that expectation is taken both over Y1 and Y2. For the sake of analytical
tractability, we concentrate on Roscas with an infinitesimally small contribution m. Evaluating
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It is seen that if u12 is positive, equation (5.2) is negative and thus not participating in a random
Rosca is the optimal decision. If, however, u12 < 0, the case is ambiguous. The question then is
whether  the  effect  of  temporal  risk  aversion  arising  from  the  negative  cross  derivative
outweighs the effect of static risk aversion arising from the concavity of u in each argument.
17
Formally, similar to Ronn, 1988, define the coefficients of static and temporal risk aversion
RAt(x1,X2) º -








 and TRAkt(x1,X2) º -
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= - + - .
Defining autarky as not participating in a Rosca, we thus have
Proposition  4:  If  TRA21(y1, y2) £  RA1(y1, y2)  and  TRA12(y1, y2) £  RA2(y1, y2)  for  all
y1, y2,  then  autarky  is  preferred  to  participation  in  a  random  Rosca  with  a  small
contribution m.
                                                
17 Notice, however, that - u12 > - u11 - u22 for all x1, x2 implies that (d
2x2/dx1
2) < 0
whenever (dx2/dx1) = 1, i.e. u’s indifference curves are not convex.21
A  borderline  case  arises  when  u(x1, x2) = v(x1 + x2)  for  some  strictly  increasing  and
concave function v.
18 Then  TRAtk = RAt = RAk  and  such  individuals  are  indifferent  between
participating in a random Rosca or not. Although a certain degree of temporal risk aversion
seems plausible for individuals whose consumption is not well above the subsistence level, it is
rather unlikely that any individual in this situation would improve her ex ante expected utility
by joining a Random Rosca.
19
B Public Information on Incomes, Oral English Auction
If Information on incomes is public and an English auction is staged in period one, it follows
from the results of section 3 that ex ante expected utility in equilibrium is given by
(5.4) E[U
3] =  EY 1[~( ( ), ) u Y Y Y m 1
0
1 + - D (1-F(Y1)) +  E u Y Y Y m Y Y Y2 1
0
2 2 1 [~( ( ), )| ] - + < D F(Y1)],
where D
0(y) º m – b
0(y)/2. For simplicity, it is assumed here that the winner of pot one pays
b
0(y) instead of b
0(y) - e. Integrating by parts and employing a change of variable gives
(5.5)  E[U




1 1 2 , [~( ( ), ) ~( ( ), )| ] + - + - + < D D .
Defining w(y,r) º 
~ ( , )
~( , )
~( , )











 and evaluating the derivative of (5.5) w.r.t. m at m = 0
yields
                                                
18  If  v(x) = x,  this  is  the  case  of  risk  neutral  agents  who  do  not  discount  future
consumption.
19 Only few studies have addressed the relationship between static and temporal risk
aversion empirically, none of them in the context of a developing country. In a data set of US
consumers,  however,  Epstein  and  Zin  (1991)  find  a  statistically  significant  positive
intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  which,  in  their  framework,  implies  that  static  risk
aversion is more pronounced than temporal risk aversion.22
Proposition 5: Assume that information on incomes is public, an English auction is
staged and Assumption 1 holds. Then a sufficient condition for participation in such a
Rosca is
(5.6) [w(yl,r) RA Y TRA Y 1 12 ( , ) ( , ) r r - ] ³ 0 for all yu ³ r ³ yl.
Proof: See Appendix 2, Section A.
Notice that, for arbitrarily small m, Assumption 1 implies that  RA Y TRA Y 1 12 ( , ) ( , ) r r >
for all yu ³ r ³ yl and that w(y,r) is strictly decreasing in r.
20 Since w(y,r) = 1 whenever y = r,
it is clear that Assumption 1 alone is not sufficient for (5.6) to hold. It is obvious, however,
that individuals whose static risk aversion is sufficiently more pronounced than their temporal
risk aversion, participate in such a Rosca.
C Private Information on Incomes, First Price Sealed Bid Auction
Turning to the case of private information on incomes, equilibrium ex ante expected utility
when a first price auction is staged can be written as
(5.7) E[U
1] =  E u Y Y Y m u Y Y Y m Y Y Y Y s s 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 , [~( ( ), ) ~( ( ), )| ] + - + - + < D D ,
which is equivalent to (5.5) with Ds substituted for D
0. We thus obtain
Proposition 6: Assume that information on incomes is private, a first price sealed bid
auction is staged and Assumption 1 holds. Then
(i) a sufficient condition for participation in such a Rosca is
(5.8) [w(yl,r) RA Y TRA Y 1 12 ( , ) ( , ) r r - ] ³ 0 for all yu ³ r ³ yl.
(ii) for arbitrarily small m, expected ex ante utility from participation in such a Rosca
is as least as high as expected ex ante utility from participation in a bidding Rosca
under public information on incomes when an oral English auction is staged.23
Proof: See Appendix 2, Section C.
Notice  that  (5.8)  and  (5.6)  are  equivalent.  Part  (ii)  of  Proposition  6  says  that,  for
certain preferences, participation in a bidding  Rosca  under  private  information  on  incomes
might  be  advantageous,  while,  for  the  same  preferences,  this  might  not  be  the  case  if
information on incomes is public.
D  Private Information on Incomes, Oral English Auction
Proceeding as in the previous subsection, equilibrium ex ante expected utility when an oral
English auction is staged can be written as
(5.9) E[U
2] =  E u Y Y Y m u Y Y Y m Y Y Y Y 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 , [~( ( ), ) ~( ( ), )| ] + - + - + < D D .
We thus obtain
Proposition 7: Assume that information on incomes is private, an oral English auction
is staged and Assumption 1 holds. Then a sufficient condition for participation in such
a Rosca is
(5.10) [w(yl,r) RA Y TRA Y 1 12 ( , ) ( , ) r r - ] ³ 0 for all yu ³ r ³ yl.
Proof: See Appendix 2, Section D.
E Discussion
For both types of auctions, temporal risk seeking and moderately temporal risk averse agents
seek to participate in a bidding Rosca. When m is close to zero and temporal and static risk
preferences are uniform in the sense that temporal are smaller than static coefficients of risk
aversion for all possible realizations of period-one income, then the set of preferences inducing
participation  in  a  random  Rosca  does  not  intersect  with  the  set  of  preferences  inducing
                                                                                                                                                      
20 See Appendix 2, Section B for a proof.24
participation  in  bidding  Roscas  with  strictly  decreasing  equilibrium  bidding  strategies.  For
preferences whose coefficient of temporal risk aversion is uniformly higher than the coefficient
of  static  period  one  risk  aversion,  participation  in  bidding  Roscas  with  strictly  increasing
equilibrium bidding strategies can be favourable. All of the qualitative empirical evidence (see,
e.g., Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998), however, suggests that such bidding behaviour does not
occur in reality, and it is therefore not analyzed in this paper.
6  The Contributions in a Bidding Rosca
In section 3, I assumed m as fixed. The participants’ problem, however, is to determine the
optimal value of m, m* say, before starting a Rosca, thus maximizing ex ante expected utility
E[U
k], k =1, 2, 3 over m. In general, this problem has no explicit solution. One can, however,
extend  some  familiar  results  about  decision  makers  with  constant  relative  (CARA)  and
constant absolute risk aversion (CRRA) to the question of optimal contributions to a Rosca.
If agents are temporal risk neutral, their utility function can always be written in an
additively separable form, i.e. u(x1, x2) = v1(x1) + v2(x2) (see Richard, 1975). For CARA, we
consider utility functions of the form u(x1, x2) = v(x1) + b v(x2) with v(y) = -Exp[-ay] and b £ 1.
In this case (5.9) evaluated at m* becomes
(6.1)  E[U
1] =
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. If the range of each
period’s income random variable is shifted upwards by say a dollars, we find that the bidding
strategy remains unaltered and the resulting ex ante expected utility is E[Ua
1 ] = -v(a)E[U0
1].
Thus, as expected, m* is independent of a.25
Turning to constant relative risk aversion, we are interested in period felicity functions
of  the  form  v(y) = (y
a – 1)/a.  Multiplying  the  income  variable  by  a  and  evaluating  at  the
optimum contribution to the Rosca, ma*, we obtain
(6.2) E[Ua
1 ] =







( * ( )/ ) ( * ( )/ )) ( ) ( ) ( / )[~( *) ~( *)] a a b a a a a a a a a 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
2
+ - + - + + + + - ,
where ba  is  the  equilibrium  bidding  strategy  corresponding  to  ma*.  It  can  be  shown  that,
evaluated at ma = am1*, E[Ua
1 ] =a
a E[U1
1] + (1+b)v(a) where ba = ab1. Thus, as expected, if
m1* maximizes E[U1
1], then ma = am1* maximizes E[Ua
1 ]. In both the CARA and the CRRA
cases, the proof for Roscas with an English auction under both private and public information
on incomes is analogous.
To  conclude  this  section,  we  consider  a  numerical  example  where
u(x1, x2) = log(x1) + b log(x2) and income within each period is uniformly distributed on the
interval [1, 2]. If there is no discounting, i.e. b = 1, the optimum contribution is 0.077 if a first
price auction is staged and 0.083 if the Rosca involves an English auction. If information on
incomes  is  public  and  there  is  an  English  auction  for  pot  one,  0.075  obtains.  For  strong
discounting, that is b = 0.5, the corresponding values are 0.104, 0.109 and 0.096, respectively.
7  Ex-ante, Interim and Ex-post Considerations
Section 5 discussed which preferences induce participation in bidding or random Roscas based
on ex ante expected utility. This section focuses on the interim and ex post stages. The former
is  most  conveniently  analyzed  graphically.  Consider  the  following  zero  sum  situation  after
incomes in period one have been revealed, where the first agent’s utility is  ~ u (y1+t1, Y+t2) and
the  second  agent  one’s  ~ u (y2-t1, Y-t2).  Their  indifference  curves  can  be  illustrated  in  the
t1-t2-plane, where the origin represents autarky. It can be shown that when agents are temporal
risk seeking or when temporal risk aversion is moderate, agent one’s indifference curves are26
convex to the origin while those of agent two are concave. Further, if y1 = y2, they have the
same slope, and if yi < yj, then i’s indifference curve is steeper than j’s at the origin. Without
loss of generality, let y1 < y2. The situation is depicted in figure 2. Agent one’s preferred set is
to the north-east while agent two’s is to the south-west.
Figure 2. Rosca allocations at the interim stage.
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If there is a Rosca with contributions m, then the set of feasible allocations is limited to
R = {(t1,t2): t2=m or t2=-m}. A random Rosca allocates the pots such that C and D of figure 2a
occur with equal probabilities. In the case of a bidding Rosca with private information, since
both types of auctions considered in this paper yield the outcome that pot one is allocated to
the participant with the lower income in period one and that bids are always smaller than 2m,
the actual outcome will always lie on one of the two broken horizontal lines. In the present
example, it is the one marked R´, since y1 < y2. Figure 2a depicts a situation where period one
incomes are such that, in principle, both participants can improve their interim expected utility
through the Rosca. In particular, the core is given by that segment of R´ that lies in the lens
bordered by I1
a and I2
a, which is denoted by Q. In contrast, Figure 2b depicts a situation where
y1 and y2 are not far enough apart from each other to provide gains from the Rosca with
contribution  m.  It  is  immediately  clear  that  in  this  latter  case,  at  the  interim  stage,  both
participants can be worse off through participation in the Rosca than under autarky.
Does a bidding Rosca always imply a Pareto improvement if incomes are sufficiently
different as depicted in figure 2a? The answer is: not always. Consider a first price auction for
pot one. It was shown in section 4 that the resulting payoffs are equivalent to those resulting
from a Rosca with no contributions in period one and a second price auction for pot two
staged in period one. First consider the role of D
0 in the context of figure 2. Agent one’s







found to be that indifference curve which cuts a straight line through the origin (denoted by g)
on both of the broken lines simultaneously. Since, in the present example, agent one’s bid is the
one  that  determines  the  actual  transfer  D  and  Ds(y) > D
0(y)  except  at  yu,  it  follows  that
Ds(y1) > t1
B. However, Ds(y1) need not fall into the set Q. If y1 is relatively low, overbidding is
high and the participants might end up to the right of Q involving an improvement for agent
one (‘she’) but a deterioration for agent two. If, however, her period one income is high,28
overbidding is small, and the equilibrium payoffs may lie somewhere to the left of I1
a. With an
English auction for pot one, the case is analogous. Now t1 = D(y2), is the resulting transfer and
again, equilibrium payoffs may involve a Pareto improvement or not.
To complete the analysis, we consider the ex post stage.  It  is  clear  that,  as  in  the
interim stage, both participants can be worse off than under autarky. Assume, for simplicity,
that they earn yi*, the certainty equivalent to period two income Y given consumption in the
first period, i.e.  ~ u (yi+ti, Y-m) = u (yi+ti, yi*-m). Then the results from the interim case carry
over directly to the ex post stage. These findings are in marked contrast to Kovsted and Lyk-
Jensen (1999) where, ex post, all members attain a higher level of utility than under autarky,
essentially  because  their  agents  face  deterministic  incomes  and  the  earlier  access  to  an
investment good through funds from the Rosca unambiguously increases every participant’s
utility.
If information on incomes is public and there is an English auction, will the participant
with the higher period-one income always improve his situation at the interim stage? In both
figure 2a  and  2b,  the  Nash  equilibrium  outcome  is  approximately  B,  because  agent  one
(y1 < y2) is driven down to approximately D
0(y1). It is thus clear that, compared to autarky,
agent  one’s  interim  situation  always  deteriorates.  Thus,  the  ex  ante  attractiveness  of
participating in a Rosca  under  these  circumstances  arises  solely  from  those  cases  where  a
prospective participant achieves the higher period-one income. But even then, an improvement
is  not  certain.  While  agent  two  unambiguously  improves  his  position  in  situations  like  in
figure 2a, where there is scope for a Pareto improvement, in general, his interim and ex post
utility might be lower than under autarky. Such a case is depicted in figure 2b.
8  Conclusion
Roscas can offer insurance for homogenous, risk averse individuals with stochastic incomes
who do not have access to credit. It has been established that, under the assumptions set out29
above, bidding Roscas offer advantages for a wide class of participants’ preferences, namely
when  temporal  risk  aversion  is  less  pronounced  than  static  risk  aversion.  Under  this
assumption, participation in a random Rosca does not occur. If, on the other hand, temporal is
stronger than static risk aversion, participation in a random Rosca increases expected utility,
while participation in a bidding Roscas can be advantageous. Compared to first-best insurance
contracts  that  can  be  arranged  when  individuals  observe  their  contract  partner’s  income,
Roscas impose severe restrictions on the set of feasible allocations among participants within
each period, arising from a fixed transfer in the last period and strategic behaviour of bidders in
prior periods. By doing this, however, they stimulate a net transfer from the better to the worse
off each time a pot is auctioned and thereby overcome information asymmetries.
When  incomes  are  public  knowledge,  more  efficient  insurance  arrangements  are
available than a Rosca. If, however, commitments involving variable contributions in the future
cannot  be  enforced,  Roscas  may  also  be  observed  because  their  key  feature  is  a  fixed
contribution  in  each  period,  an  escape  from  which  is  only  possible  by  default.  In  such
situations,  the  results  derived  here  suggest  that  participation  in  a  bidding  Rosca  is
advantageous to individuals whose static risk aversion is stronger than temporal risk aversion.
In  this  paper,  it  has  been  shown  that  equilibrium  bidding  likely  causes  outcomes  that  are
inferior to the situation in which incomes are private information. In this connection it should
be noted that the analysis is restricted to a one-shot game. Should participants decide to start a
new Rosca once one is finished, there would be a repeated game, and socially more favourable
forms of bidding might be observed, with participants not complying with such a norm being
excluded from future Roscas.
In Besley et al. (1993) and Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999), it is proved that, for a
group of homogenous individuals, a random Rosca is always preferred. In contrast, the results
derived  here  suggest  that,  if  reasonable  restrictions  on  preferences  are  imposed,  a  bidding30
Rosca is preferred, because it can allocate funds to those with the most urgent current need.
This is, in principle, a similar effect to that observed in the former two studies when individuals
are heterogeneous. There, however, heterogeneity is a permanent individual characteristic and
bidding serves to accommodate those with the highest willingness to pay first, which in turn
generates a gain for the other members through the distribution of the winning bid. In the
model presented in this paper, individuals are identical ex  ante  and  it  is  individual-specific
uncertainty that generates potential gains from intertemporal trade.
The predictions of the present model better explain the transactions observed in many
actual Roscas, where neither the net transfers to the recipients of pots increase steadily with
the number of rounds played, nor does the implied interest rate for such funds remain constant
or  decrease  monotonically.  Both  of  these  quantities  fluctuate  significantly  in  the  model
presented  here,  although,  even  in  the  absence  of  savings  opportunities  outside  the  Rosca,
observed transfers to recipients of pots will increase on average if there is a positive rate of
time preference. This is fully in accordance with empirical observation, such as in Calomiris
and Rajaraman (1999).
Many of the results derived in this paper carry over to Roscas with more than two
participants. If individuals are engaged in several Roscas simultaneously whose participants do
not wholly overlap, their bidding strategies, as well  as  the  outcomes,  will  change.  Further
analysis is needed to clarify what constitutes an intertemporally optimal portfolio of Rosca
shares and how the resulting outcome compares to the benchmark case of a complete set of
markets for Arrow-Debreu securities.
Appendix 1
This appendix discusses conditions that ensure that (3.1) and (3.7) assume local maxima when
evaluated at b and bs, respectively. Evaluating the second derivative of (3.1) at b(y) gives31
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It has been shown in Section 3 that the second fraction in brackets is positive. Thus, to ensure
that (A1.1) is negative,  the  first  fraction  in  brackets  must  be  bigger  than  the  second  one.
Writing  the  differences  in  the  numerators  of  the  fractions  in  (A1.1)  as  line  integrals,
~( ( ), ) ~( ( ), ) u y y Y m u y y Y m i s i s 1 1 1 1 + - - - + D D
 = D D D ( )~ ( ( ), ) ~ ( ( ), ) y u y y Y m mu y y Y m d i s i s 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
1
1
+ - - + -
-
+
r r r r r, i = 1, 2,
and using the coefficients of static and temporal risk aversion as defined in section 5 allows us
to rewrite (A1.1) as
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Since u1 and u2 are strictly positive by assumption, sufficient conditions for the negativity of
(A1.2) are
(i)  RA y y Y m RA y y Y m s s 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) + - £ + - D D r r  for all r Î [-1,1]
(ii)  TRA y y Y m RA y y Y m s s 12 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) + - £ + - r r D D  for all r Î [-1,1].
If  the  utility  function  exhibits  utility  independence  (see  Richard,  1975)  it  follows  that  the
coefficients of static and temporal risk aversion depend on period one consumption only. In
this case, (i) and (ii) respectively become
(i)’ RA y y RA y y s s 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( )) ( ( )) + £ + D D r  for all r Î [-1,1]32
(ii)’ TRA y y RA y y s s 12 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( )) ( ( )) + £ + rD D  for all r Î [-1,1].
(i)’ is implied by decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) for period one decisions while (ii)’
holds if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static period one risk aversion.
For the second price auction, we evaluate the second derivative of (3.7) at bs(y1):
(A1.3)
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As shown in section 3, the second fraction in brackets is negative. Further, if u12 ³ 0, then
~( ( ), ) ~( ( ), ) u y y Y m u y y Y m 1 1 1 1 1 1 + - - - + D D £ 0. Thus,  for  the  second  price  auction,  temporal
risk neutrality or temporal risk preference ensures a local maximum. If, on the other hand,
u12 £ 0, the following sufficient conditions can be obtained.
(iii)  RA y y Y m RA y y Y m 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) - + £ + - D D r r  for all r Î [-1,1]
(iv)  TRA y y Y m RA y y Y m 12 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) + - £ - + r r D D  for all r Î [-1,1]
If utility independence holds,
(iii)’ RA y y RA y y 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( )) ( ( )) - £ + D D r  for all r Î [-1,1]
(iv)’ TRA y y RA y y 12 1 1 1 1 1 ( ( )) ( ( )) + £ - rD D  for all r Î [-1,1].
(iii)’ is implied by non-decreasing absolute risk aversion while, as in (ii)’, (iv)’ holds if temporal
risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion.
If preferences are such that a ‘³’ obtains instead of ‘£’ in (i) and (ii) [(iii) and (iv)]
simultaneously, then b(y) [bs(y)] is a local minimum. In such cases, however, an increasing
Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy b
#(y) [bs
#(y)] exists that maximizes interim expected
utility.
Sufficient conditions for pseudoconcavity of (3.1) and (3.7) in b1 which ensures global
maxima, can be derived along the same lines as for the local maxima. The  content  of  the33
resulting conditions is essentially the same as that of (i)-(iv), although the notation becomes
considerably messier.
Appendix 2
A Proof of Proposition 5
Another way to write equation (5.5) is
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follows from the fact that, given the infinitesimal version of Assumption 1 holds, w(y,r) is
strictly increasing in y. See Section B of this appendix. QED
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which is always negative if RA1(y,Y) > TRA12(y,Y) for all y, and
¶
¶
w r ( , ) y
y
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which is always positive if RA1(y,Y) > TRA12(y,Y) for all y.
C Proof of Proposition 6 (i) and (ii)
Write equation (5.7) as
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 for all y < yu. To see this, notice that, at
m = 0,  D
0(y) = Ds(y) = 0  for  all  y.  Further,  recall  that,  as  a  consequence  of  Proposition 2,
Ds(y) > D
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To ensure that, for arbitrarily small m, b(y) is in fact an optimal strategy in the Bayes-
Nash sense, optimality of b(y) requires 
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21 Since
                                                
21 As in Appendix 1, this requirement only ensures local, not global optimality of b(y).35
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,  evaluated  at  m = 0,  is  equal  to  zero,  for  an  infinitesimally  small  m,
optimality of b(y) thus requires that
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which  is  satisfied  when  TRA y Y RA y Y 12 1 1 1 ( , ) ( , ) <   for  all  y1.  But  this  is  exactly  what  the
infinitesimal version of Assumption 1 says [see equation (A2.3)]. QED
D Proof of Proposition 7
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 for all y > yl. To see this,
notice  that  D(y) > D
0(yl)  for  all  y > yl  and  m > 0  (see  Proposition  3).  Further,  at  m = 0,
D












 for all y > yl.
Ensuring that, for arbitrarily small m, bs(y) is in fact an optimal strategy in the Bayes-Nash
sense, yields the same expression as equation (A2.5). QED
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